Open source CLI and SDK. Self-hostable. Built for the A2A Protocol.

The Identity and Trust Layer for AI Agents

Give every agent a cryptographic identity. Verify it in <1ms. Block impostors at the boundary.

Think Let's Encrypt, but for agents.

Shipping now: RFC001โ€“003|Roadmap: Chain-of-custody (RFC004), Policy (RFC005)

Built for the Google A2A Protocol. Works with MCP, REST, GraphQL, and any HTTP-based agent.

๐Ÿ” Identity (WHO)Ed25519 signed badges prove which agent is calling
๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Integrity (WHAT)SHA-256 body hashing proves the payload wasn't tampered
โฑ๏ธ Freshness (WHEN)60-second windows prove the request isn't a replay

2026: Agent Security Is Not Model Security

The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026) identifies the critical security risks for autonomous AI systems. CapiscIO directly addresses the identity and trust risks at the top of the list.

๐Ÿ“‹ OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026)

AG01: Agent Identity Spoofing
โ—‹AG02: Tool & Function Misuse
AG03: Privilege Compromise
โ—‹AG04: Uncontrolled Agentic Actions
AG05: Improper Multi-Agent Orchestration
โ—‹AG06: Memory & Context Manipulation
โ—‹AG07: Agent Supply Chain Compromise
โ—‹AG08: Model Instruction Override
AG09: Malicious Agent Injection
AG10: Audit & Observability Gaps

= CapiscIO addresses | Source: genai.owasp.org, developed with 100+ industry experts

Your agents are calling APIs that move money, access customer data, and modify production infrastructure.

Most AI security focuses on the model: prompt injection, jailbreaks, data poisoning. But agentic systems have a different attack surface: identity spoofing, unauthorized tool access, malicious agent injection. These aren't model problems. They're infrastructure problems.

OWASP RiskWhat It MeansHow CapiscIO Helps
AG01: Agent Identity SpoofingAttacker claims to be a trusted agentEd25519 signatures verify agent identity cryptographically
AG03: Privilege CompromiseAgent gains access beyond its intended scopeTrust levels (0-4) encode verified privilege boundaries
AG05: Multi-Agent OrchestrationDelegation chains without accountabilityDID-based identity persists through agent handoffs
AG09: Malicious Agent InjectionRogue agent enters trusted environmentGuard blocks unsigned/unverified requests at boundary
AG10: Audit & Observability GapsCan't answer "which agent did this?"Structured logs with verified agent identity on every request

Common Failure Modes We Help Prevent

These are real incidents from teams running agents in production

Schema Drift

Third-party agent changed their schema

No validation gate. 4 hours of errors before engineering noticed.

โ†’ CLI validates agent cards in CI before they hit production

Validate before deploy โ†’
Replay Attack

Valid request captured, replayed 100+ times overnight

No timestamp validation. Compute budget drained.

โ†’ Guard enforces 60-second replay windows. Same request twice? Blocked.

Block replay attacks โ†’
Attribution Gap

Logs showed an API call. But which agent?

Impersonation? Delegation? Unknown. Incident review stalled.

โ†’ Guard logs verified agent identity on every request

View security guarantees โ†’

What You Get Today vs. What's Next

Cryptographic enforcement at the boundary today. Chain-of-custody and policy as your swarm scales.

GA Today

RFC001โ€“003 โ€ข View security guarantees

  • โœ“Verify caller identity: Ed25519 signatures
  • โœ“Issue trust badges: IAL-0 (self-asserted), IAL-1 (proof of key possession)
  • โœ“Detect tampering: SHA-256 body hash bound to signature
  • โœ“Block replays: 60s window, 5s clock skew tolerance
  • โœ“Drop-in integration: Python SDK & Go sidecar

In Development

RFC004 โ€ข Q1 2026

  • โ†’Trace delegation chains: Who delegated to whom?
  • โ†’Detect missing hops: Shadow agents become visible
  • โ†’Reconstruct incidents: Full call chain for any action

Roadmap

RFC005 โ€ข Q2 2026

  • โ—‹Enforce policies: Which agents can call which tools?
  • โ—‹Set obligations: Budget limits, data access rules
  • โ—‹Export to SIEM/OTel: Decisions in your stack

How It Works

Verification flow, example logs, and deployment topology

Verification Flow

1Request arrives with X-Capiscio-Badge header
2Guard extracts JWS from header
3Verify Ed25519 signature against kid
4Check iat/exp within 60s window
5Hash body, compare to bh claim
โœ“All pass โ†’ forward to handler
โœ—Any fail โ†’ 401/403, log reason

Structured Log Output

# Allowed request
{
  "event": "agent_call_allowed",
  "iss": "did:web:payments.example.com",
  "kid": "key-2024-q4",
  "decision_ms": 2.3
}
# Blocked request
{
  "event": "agent_call_denied",
  "reason": "signature_invalid",
  "iss": "did:web:unknown.attacker.com",
  "kid": "spoofed-key"
}

Export to Datadog, Splunk, or OpenTelemetry. Body content is never logged.

Drop-in Deployment

๐Ÿ
Python SDK
FastAPI, Flask, Django
pip install capiscio-sdk
๐Ÿ”ท
Go Sidecar
Any HTTP service, K8s sidecar
docker pull capiscio/guard
โš™๏ธ
CLI + CI
GitHub Actions, GitLab CI
npm install -g capiscio

Five Trust Levels: Like SSL Certificates, But for Agents

Not all identity verification is equal. Choose the level that matches your risk tolerance.

LevelNameWhat It ProvesUse Case
0Self-Signed (SS)"I generated a keypair"Development, testing
1Domain Validated (DV)"I control this domain"Production APIs
2Organization Validated (OV)"I am this legal entity"Enterprise integrations
3Extended Validation (EV)"I've been audited"Financial, healthcare
4Community Vouched (CV)"Peers vouch for me"Decentralized networks

All five levels are implemented today in our registry (RFC-002). Verification requirements increase with each level.

Sound familiar? It's the same model that made HTTPS ubiquitous. SSL certificates prove a server is who it claims to be. Trust Badges prove an agent is who it claims to be.

Open Source Tools. Hosted Registry When You're Ready.

Pricing is per service identity, not per request, not per instance.

A service identity is a logical role like "billing-agent" or "support-triage-agent".

Open Source

CLI + SDK + Local Verification
Free
Apache 2.0 Licensed
  • capiscio CLI: unlimited
  • capiscio-sdk middleware
  • Self-hosted trust store
  • Offline verification mode
View on GitHub โ†’

Hosted Registry

Managed identity infrastructure
$79/mo
Starting at 3 service identities
  • Managed badge issuance
  • DID resolution
  • Key rotation & revocation
  • 14-day free trial
Start Trial โ†’

Agent Trust Sprint

Hands-on deployment
$15kโ€“$25k
2-week engagement
  • Agent flow inventory
  • Threat model & policy baseline
  • Guard deployment & SIEM
  • 50% credited to subscription
Apply โ†’

Building with AI Agents? Shape the Trust Layer.

We're looking for early design partners: teams running agents in production who want to co-develop the identity and governance features that matter most. No sales pitch. Just problem-solving together.

Protocol-Agnostic Enforcement

A2A is the first standard. Your stack will be multi-standard.

CapiscIO started by enforcing the A2A Protocol (Google/Linux Foundation) and applies the same guard pattern to any agent traffic.

Same verification semantics work for A2A, MCP, custom protocols, and whatever emerges next.

Developer Experience First

Drop-in guard for your agent endpoints. No external SaaS, no config files, no SDK lock-in.

One command to validate and test:

Terminal
capiscio validate ./agent-card.json --test-live
โœ… A2A AGENT VALIDATION PASSED
Agent: ./agent-card.json
Score: 95/100
๐Ÿ” VALIDATION SUMMARY:
๐Ÿ“Š 12 checks: 12 passed, 0 failed, 1 warning
โฑ๏ธ Completed in 245ms

One guard to protect:

from fastapi import FastAPI
from capiscio_sdk import SimpleGuard

app = FastAPI()

# Add a protocol aware guard in two lines.
guard = SimpleGuard(app)

@app.post("/transfer")
async def transfer():
    return {"status": "ok"}

Latest Insights

Learn about A2A Protocol, agent validation, and trust infrastructure

Your Agents Are Already in Production.
Give Them an Identity They Can Prove.

Start with the CLI. Validate your agent cards. Add Guard when you're ready for runtime enforcement. Use the hosted registry when you need managed infrastructure.

pip install capiscio (CLI) ยท pip install capiscio-sdk (SDK)