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Trust Infrastructure for Production Agentic Systems

Who controls this AI agent?
SecOps: We do. Here's the proof.

Agent identity, payload integrity, and trust enforcement—cryptographically verified on every request.
When auditors ask which agents accessed production, you don't correlate logs. You show proof.

<1 ms
Sub-millisecond verification overhead (varies by environment)
Ed25519
Cryptographic signing
Levels 0–4
Trust enforcement
You Already Have This Problem

Something Is Calling Your APIs Right Now

You can't prove which agent sent it. You can't prove the payload wasn't modified. That's the default.
Most failures aren't nation-state attacks. They're internal: a forked agent, a staging key that leaked to prod, a contractor's tool calling endpoints it shouldn't.

Tokens Without Attestation

OAuth and API keys authenticate users and apps — not agents. When an LLM calls your tool, you have a bearer token. You don't have cryptographic proof of which agent is calling or what trust level it holds.

No Payload Binding

Payloads get modified across hops, proxies, retries, and queues. Bearer tokens don't bind to message content — that "verified" request could have been tampered with three services ago.

Flat Permissions

IAM gives you allow/deny. Agents need graduated trust. Your dev agent and your production agent look identical to your tools — one is a self-signed test build, one has verified provenance. You treat them the same.

The Threat Is Already Inside

You don't need an APT. You need one engineer who deployed from a fork, one staging key that got committed, one contractor agent that "just needs read access." That's your threat model.

Agent Sprawl Is Already Here

Agents created by templates, copilots, CI jobs. Identity and provenance drift faster than your governance docs update. When the auditor asks "which agents can access production tools?"—can you answer?

Your IAM secures the login. What secures the chain after?

Auth0 and Okta verify the user who launched an agent. Astrix discovers shadow identities. Neither provides cryptographic proof of what happened at hop 2, 3, or 10 — or across organizational boundaries.

🔗

Every Hop Signed

Agent identity and every request cryptographically signed at every hop — not just the first. Delegation chains form a verifiable audit trail from origin to final action.

⛓️

Scoped Delegation

Hash-chained authority envelopes ensure delegated agents can never exceed what was granted. Scope narrows at each hop — by design, not by policy.

🌐

Cross-Domain Trust

Agents from different organizations verify each other through a shared registry CA — like TLS, trust the root once. No per-org federation, no shared IdP, no SAML plumbing.

📖

Open Protocol

8 published RFCs with runtime observability and cross-protocol interop on the roadmap. Open source Go core that works alongside your existing identity stack.

OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026

Aligned with OWASP Agentic Security

We publish a detailed threat model, OWASP mapping, and hard boundaries. See the full matrix and guarantees on the Security page.

Evidence-First Security

We document exactly what we protect and what we don't. No vague claims.

Trust Enforcement Use Cases

CapiscIO fits wherever agents communicate. These are the patterns we see most.

Multi-Agent Orchestration

Agent A calls Agent B. You need to know it's actually Agent A. Not a fork. Not a replay. Not a test build that leaked to prod.

MCP Tool Server Protection

Claude is calling your database tool. Or is it? Know which LLM or agent is making the call before you expose DELETE access.

Agentic Workflow Security

Requests hop across services, queues, and retries. One decorator per endpoint. No protocol changes. Auth that survives the journey.

Audit-Ready Access Control

When the auditor asks "which agents touched production last quarter?"—you have cryptographic proof, not log correlation.

What CapiscIO Adds at Runtime

Three outcomes. Every request. When Guard is deployed.

Authenticated Caller

Know which agent sent this request. Cryptographic proof, not just a header.

Tamper Detection

Know if the payload was modified. Body hash binding catches any change.

Trust Threshold

Enforce minimum trust levels in your middleware. For example: require Level 2+ for production tools and deny self-signed dev callers.

Designed for Real Production Workflows

CapiscIO is purpose-built for agentic AI systems where requests hop across services and tool servers. If you're securing internal agent-to-tool calls, you need authentication and integrity that survives retries, queues, and multi-hop orchestration.

Trust Infrastructure Products

Two protocols, two guards, one security model.

A2A Protocol

Agent Guard

For agent-to-agent communication. Caller identity, payload integrity, trust levels—verified before your handler runs.

  • One decorator. No protocol changes.
  • Python SDK or Go sidecar
  • Sub-millisecond verification overhead
Learn More
MCP Protocol

MCP Guard

For MCP tool servers. Know which LLM or agent is calling before you expose write access to your database.

  • @require_trust(level=2) on any tool
  • Works with Claude, GPT, any MCP client
  • Per-tool evidence logging (RFC-006)
Learn More

Stop Trusting Anonymous Agents

CLI is free. SDK is open source. Production security starts in five minutes.
Or keep hoping nothing calls your production API that shouldn't.

Agent Trust FAQ

Practical answers for securing internal agent deployments